



What types should not be
Bruno Bentzen
Abstract In a series of papers Ladyman and Presnell raise an
interesting challenge of providing a pre-mathematical justification for
homotopy type theory. In response, they propose what they claim to be
an informal semantics for homotopy type theory where types and terms
are regarded as mathematical concepts. The aim of this paper is to raise
some issues which need to be resolved for the successful development of
their types-as-concepts interpretation.
1 Introduction
We say that a putative foundation for mathematics has justificatory
autonomy if it is possible to justify its claims without first
assuming some background mathematical theory, or rather, if we
can give a pre-mathematical informal explanation of the meaning
of the basic notions upon which the theory rests. According to
this idea, to provide a justification for a mathematical theory is
nothing but to develop an informal semantics that describes the
intended interpretation of that theory without assuming previous
mathematical knowledge. For example, the justificatory autonomy
of a material set theory such as ZFC can be said to follow
from the iterative conception of set (Boolos, 1971), a standard
intuitive justification for the axioms of sets according to which
the mathematical universe is divided into a well-ordered cumulative
hierarchy of sets.
In a series of three long papers, Ladyman and Presnell (2015,
2016, 2017) raise an interesting challenge to a promising candidate
for foundation of mathematics known as homotopy type theory: the
standard justifications for the axioms and rules of inference of the
framework appear to be largely based on sophisticated concepts from
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homotopy theory, whereas the primitive concepts of a supposedly
autonomous foundation (in the sense being considered) should not
be grounded on notions borrowed from other fields of mathematics.1
In response to this observation, Ladyman and Presnell (2016)
announced a program for developing an informal semantics for
homotopy type theory based on an interpretation of types as
mathematical concepts, which is used to claim that homotopy type
theory can be an autonomous foundation for mathematics.
The aim of this paper is to raise some issues which need to be
resolved for the successful development of Ladyman and Presnell’s
types-as-concepts interpretation—our primary purpose is, hence,
negative. More specifically, our main criticism will be directed to
the following points:
(i) It is no improvement to justify path induction in terms of two
other unjustified principles;
(ii) The types-as-concepts interpretation is incompletely specified,
in particular it does not explain what concepts are and how
type formers are to be understood;
(iii) Under one reasonable such specification, the types-as-concepts
interpretation justifies the law of excluded middle, in the
unrestricted form that is incompatible with univalence;
(iv) The interpretation of universes makes it unclear, at best, as to
when and whether the “concepts” in question are intensional
or extensional;
(v) The proposed justification of univalence is incomplete, and
there is no discussion of higher inductive types.
It is important to stress that our goal is not to completely demolish
the program of Ladyman and Presnell, but to identify some crucial
issues that they will have to overcome in order to make their program
plausible. We believe that the concern of Ladyman and Presnell
is legitimate, although, in our view, they fail to provide a clear
answer as to whether or not homotopy type theory has autonomy
as a foundation for mathematics.
1It is not the logical autonomy of homotopy type theory (whether it is possible
to use it as a framework or language for mathematics without appealing to
some prior theory) but its justificatory autonomy that has been questioned by
Ladyman and Presnell—for briefness, ‘autonomy’ means ‘justificatory autonomy’
throughout this paper, unless stated otherwise. For a detailed discussion of
various forms of autonomy (in the context of category theory), the reader is
encouraged to consult Linnebo and Pettigrew (2011, §3,§5).
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2
gives an overview of homotopy type theory and the standard informal
semantics of constructive type theory known as the “meaning
explanations”. Section 3, the main section of the paper, examines
Ladyman and Presnell’s response to the challenge of autonomy and
their types-as-concepts interpretation, an informal semantics which
can be seen as an alternative to the meaning explanations. Section 4
briefly compares the meaning explanations and the types-as-concepts
interpretation in terms of their pre-mathematical nature and which
axioms and rules of inference they justify. Section 5 gives some
closing remarks.
2 Homotopy type theory
In a broad sense, homotopy type theory (UFP, 2013) is a
foundational language for mathematics in which equalities between
terms of a certain type are explicitly treated as paths between
points in a certain space. It extends the so-called “identity type”
of constructive type theory (Martin-Löf, 1975) by allowing for new
ways of obtaining equality proofs between terms.
The identity type of x and y in A, written x =A y, is a type
that can be formed for any terms x and y of type A. Traditionally,
however, its introduction rule states that reflexivity reflx is the only
term of x =A x (UFP, 2013, §1.12):
x : A
reflx : x =A x
.
In the homotopy type theory book (UFP, 2013), the theory is
presented as an augmentation of constructive type theory with
two axioms for equality, namely, the univalence axiom and higher
inductive types, which populate the identity type with new terms
(other than reflx) for obtaining equality proofs.
This conventional presentation of homotopy type theory is the
one considered by Ladyman and Presnell (2015, 2016, 2017) in their
series of papers.2 To avoid confusion, I shall term it ‘Book HoTT’
and use ‘homotopy type theory’ in the broad sense described above.
2Except that Ladyman and Presnell (2015, 2016, 2017) have never discussed
higher inductive types in their papers, so we omit the subject here for conciseness.
The univalence axiom is introduced in Section 3.3.
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2.1 The meaning explanations
While the status of homotopy type theory as an autonomous
foundation is debatable, the matter is certainly less controversial for
constructive type theory: the correctness of the rules of the theory is
well-known to possess a simple but rigorous justification provided by
the meaning explanations (Martin-Löf, 1982), a standard intuitive
semantics that validates the rules of inference of a type theory via
an explanation grounded on computation.
Starting with a primitive untyped notion of computation, a
meaning explanation ascribes expressions to terms or types based
on their computational behavior, and then explains the meaning
of a judgment depending on the values the expressions involved in
that judgment compute to (Constable et al., 1985; Nordström et al.,
1990). The basic principle is that the correctness of a rule of inference
is determined by the correctness of the judgments it is composed of.
Computation is given by an operational semantics that prescribes a
collection of valid programs as sequences of computational steps and
consequently provides us with a precise notion of evaluation—a finite
sequence of one-step computations from closed terms (terms with no
occurrence of free variables) to their canonical normal form (values).
With a particular notion of evaluation in hands we endow each one
of the basic forms of judgments of the type theory with meaning by
saying what is to know a judgment of each form.
In constructive type theory we have four forms of judgments that
assert that something is a type, two types are definitionally equal, a
term is a member of a type, and two terms are definitionally equal
at a type (Martin-Löf, 1984, p.3). Those judgments typically have
their meaning explained as follows:
(i) To know that A is a type is to know that A evaluates to a
canonical type;
To know a canonical type is to know
(a) how to construct a canonical term of that canonical type;
(b) how to show that two canonical terms of it are
definitionally equal;
(ii) To know that A and B are definitionally equal types is to know
that they have exactly the same terms;
(iii) To know that a is term of type A is to know that a evaluates
to a canonical term of that type;
(iv) To know that a and b are definitionally equal terms at type A is
to know that a and b evaluate to definitionally equal canonical
terms of that type;
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The schemes above are just a rough characterization and a detailed
description of the meaning explanations is out of the scope of this
paper (see Martin-Löf (1984)). Fortunately, enough has been said to
suggest that types can be understood as program specifications and
terms as programs.
It will come as no surprise to many that the meaning explanations
of constructive type theory fail to justify Book HoTT: the use of
axioms in a type theory is known to block computation in general,
because axioms introduce new canonical terms to types without
specifying how to compute with them (UFP, 2013, §0); so when one
extends a type theory with an axiom one might break the process
of evaluation of a term to its canonical form, thus undermining any
attempt to endow the theory with a meaning explanation since the
theory no longer posses a well-behaved notion of computation. In
sum, Book HoTT adds new canonical terms to the identity type
without explaining how the type theory is supposed to compute with
them.
Even worse, since the reflexivity term is the only canonical term
of the identity type in constructive type theory, and because reflx :
x =A y only holds if x and y are definitionally equal terms, the
meaning explanations validate a “reflection rule” that collapses any
equality x =A y into a definitional equality of x and y at A (Dybjer,
2012). But this rule implies a principle known as uniqueness of
identity proofs (UIP), which states that any two equality proofs are
equal up to a higher equality proof:
a, b : A p, q : a =A b
uip : p =a=Ab q
. (UIP)
Since UIP is inconsistent with homotopy type theory (UFP, 2013,
§2.14,§3.1.9) (otherwise it would not be possible to keep track
of different equality proofs between two terms), the meaning
explanations of constructive type theory will fail to justify any
particular presentation of homotopy type theory.
3 The program of Ladyman and Presnell
3.1 Path induction
From the discussion in the preceding section it can be seen that the
constant concern of Ladyman and Presnell (2015, 2016, 2017) about
the status of homotopy type theory as an autonomous foundation
for mathematics is well founded. Homotopy type theory is just a
particular form of type theory, and while type theories are usually
thought of having a justification in the meaning explanations, that
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is not the case for Book HoTT.3 Nevertheless, the main objection of
Ladyman and Presnell is not that the autonomy of homotopy type
theory is dubious because it does not admit a meaning explanation.
Rather, their point is that what they see as the informal semantics
offered in the homotopy type theory book (UFP, 2013) is not pre-
mathematical.
They start their series of papers arguing that the justification
for the elimination rule of the identity type offered in the homotopy
type theory book (UFP, 2013) is largely based on advanced concepts
from homotopy theory while it is supposed to be pre-mathematical.
This is the central topic of their first paper (Ladyman and Presnell,
2015) and a more general statement of the problem along the same
lines is found in their second paper (Ladyman and Presnell, 2016,
§§3.4.1–4).4 The elimination rule for the identity type roughly states
that given two terms x, y : A, an equality proof p : x =A y and a
type family P , it is enough to have a term u : P (x, x, reflx) in order
to define a term of the type P (x, y, p) (UFP, 2013, §1.12.1),
x, y : A, p : x =A y, u : P (x, x, reflx)
pathindP (x, y, p, u) : P (x, y, p)
.
Inspired by the homotopy interpretation of type theory (UFP, 2013,
§2) in which a type A is a space, a term x : A is a point in the space
A, and an equality proof p : x =A y is a path in the space A with
initial point x and final point y, this elimination rule is often called
“path induction” in homotopy type theory because on the intended
interpretation it implies that to prove a property of a path p : x =A y
it suffices to assume that p is the identity path reflx : x =A x since
all properties expressible in the sytem are homotopy invariant, and
so are preserved under homotopy of paths.
It is difficult to see why Ladyman and Presnell (2015) insist on
focusing their attention on path induction specifically, since their
motivation is not so clear in their first paper. But perhaps there
is a reason for that: a standard way of justifying elimination rules
of type formers—or propositions, according to the propositions-as-
types paradigm, a well-know correspondence between types and
propositions formulated by Howard (1980)—is to establish that the
meaning of that type former is determined by its introduction rules.
This general idea of “logical harmony” is very well explained in the
words of Gentzen:
3It is not easy to say whether Ladyman and Presnell are aware of that because
the meaning explanations are constantly omitted from the discussions in their
series of papers (Ladyman and Presnell, 2015, 2016, 2017).
4The problem is not stated again in the third paper of the series; instead,
Ladyman and Presnell (2017, §1) refer the reader to their second paper.
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The introductions represent, as it were, the ‘definitions’
of the symbols concerned, and the eliminations are no
more, in the final analysis, than the consequences of these
definitions. This fact may be expressed as follows: In
eliminating a symbol, we may use the formula with whose
terminal symbol we are dealing only ‘in the sense afforded
it by the introduction of that symbol’. An example may
clarify what is meant: We were able to introduce the
formula A ⊃ B when there existed a derivation of B from
the assumption formula A. If we then wished to use that
formula by eliminating the ⊃-symbol [...], we could do
this precisely by inferring B directly, once A has been
proved, for what A ⊃ B attests is just the existence of
a derivation of B from A. (Gentzen and Szabo, 1969,
p.80-1)
This gives us a form of justification for elimination rules that
is used by many different semantics, including, notably, the
meaning explanations. Type-theoretically, harmony states that the
introduction rules of a type specify the only way of generating terms
of that type, so in order to define a function out of that type it is
enough to determine what it should do on terms explicitly obtained
by introduction rules. Unfortunately, harmony can only explain
path-induction if we maintain that the only terms of the identity type
are reflexivity, and this contradicts the introduction of univalence
and higher inductive types as additional ways of generating new
equalities. Since the most direct route for the justification of path
induction is blocked for Book HoTT, it is possible that Ladyman and
Presnell chose to focus at first on path induction with this scenario in
mind. Without a proper clarification, however, it seems as if they are
regarding the justification of path induction as an individual problem
at this point of their program, instead of providing a single informal
semantics that can simultaneously justify all the axioms and rules of
inferences of Book HoTT, including path induction—they will only
address this point in their second and third papers, which we discuss
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
The first response of Ladyman and Presnell (2015, §6) to the
challenge of autonomy is to simply articulate a supposedly pre-
mathematical justification for path induction. This justification
leaves much to be desired, however, since what they propose is to
take two unjustified rules of type theory and justify path induction
using them as primitive principles.
One of those principles that are taken for granted is a
type-theoretic generalization of Leibniz’s law of indiscernibility of
identicals that states that if two entities x and y are identical then
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every property P possessed by x is also possessed by y and vice versa
(Ladyman and Presnell, 2015, §6.3),
x, y : A, p : x =A y, u : P (x)
transportP (p, u) : P (y)
.
The other one (referred to as the uniqueness principle for the identity
type) basically states that reflx determines all equalities x =A y up
to the equality of x and y in A (Ladyman and Presnell, 2015, §6.2),
a : A, w :
∑





where the pair constructor 〈x, y〉, where x : A and y : B(x), is the
canonical term of the associated type
∑
(x:A)B(x).
Finally, Ladyman and Presnell (2015, §6.4) show that path
induction can be derived from those two principles and conclude
their paper by saying that ‘path induction can be justified on the
basis of pre-mathematical principles’ (§7).
But no comprehensive justification for the correctness of these
two principles is found in the paper. Instead they just take it as given
that Leibniz’s law of indiscernibility of identicals is ‘a fundamental
part of our pre-mathematical understanding of identity’ (Ladyman
and Presnell, 2015, §6.3) and appeal to the fact that each type should
come with a uniqueness principle without ever properly indicating a
means to justify them, at least other than saying that these ‘formal
statements capture more precisely the sense in which the token
constructors for a type give us all the tokens of that type.’ (Ladyman
and Presnell, 2015, §6.1).5
3.2 The types-as-concepts interpretation
In their second paper, Ladyman and Presnell (2016) consider
a general approach to the challenge of autonomy where instead
of addressing a particular problem of justification as an isolated
problem, as in their first work, they present a full informal semantics
with the intention of justifying all the axioms and rules of inference
of Book HoTT at once. Those new justifications comprises Ladyman
and Presnell’s previous argument for path induction (2015, §6) which
happens to be given again in the second paper (2016, §6).
5See Klev (2017, §5) for a more detailed argumentation against Ladyman and
Presnell’s justification of path induction and a demonstration of the justification
of this same rule via the meaning explanations of constructive type theory (Klev,
2017, §3).
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Ladyman and Presnell (2016) start proposing their own ideas for
the informal semantics with a short digression where they discuss an
“initially appealing” interpretation of terms as mathematical objects
and types as kinds of mathematical objects that is rejected under
the allegation that, among other reasons, it subscribes to a strong
kind of realism, and that it cannot explain why each term must
belong to exactly one type (§5.1). Immediately after that failed
attempt, Ladyman and Presnell (2016, §5.2) articulate an alternative
account of terms and types as mathematical concepts: terms and
types correspond to specific and general (mathematical) concepts,
respectively, so the membership judgment a : A means that the
specific concept given by a falls under (or is an instance of) the
general concept given by A. For example, we can understand the
judgment 0 : N as the assertion that the concept being zero is an
instance of the general concept being a natural number. Ladyman
and Presnell (2016) are fully aware that they must say a few things
about concepts to get this interpretation off the ground, but instead
of developing a complete theory of concepts they just highlight seven
particular features of concepts that according to them are relevant
to the discussion. They only mention that:
(i) Concepts may exist regardless of the existence of an instance
of it;
(ii) Concepts can be concrete or abstract, and specific or general;
(iii) Concepts need not be mind-dependent;
(iv) Concepts have an intensional nature;
(v) Complex concepts can be formed from basic ones;
(vi) Features of concepts can be abstracted;
(vii) General concepts can be instantiated with specific concepts.
Although it is arguably pre-mathematical and it has no
commitment to realism (it does not rely on the existence
of mathematical objects), this interpretation still needs some
refinement—Ladyman and Presnell (2016) quickly observe that
conceiving terms as specific concepts does not allow them to explain
why a term must belong to exactly one type. This fact forces
them to slightly modify their account by viewing terms not as
specific concepts, but as specific concepts qua instance of a general
concept. Finally, given their subscription to the propositions-as-
types paradigm, Ladyman and Presnell (2016, §7.2) seem to imply
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that a proposition is true when the concept that it represents has an
instance.
It seems doubtful whether the types-as-concepts interpretation
can make things better for homotopy type theory because an
explanation of terms and types as concepts can only shed light on the
matter if we take for granted that our understanding of the nature
of concepts is not problematic. Later in the paper, Ladyman and
Presnell (2016, §8.1) consider the objection that it is unclear what
concepts are and what their metaphysical status is. In response they
maintain that
although we do invoke concepts in our interpretation
of tokens and types, the features of concepts that we
rely upon in Section 5.2 are only those straightforward
features that follow from our intuitive understanding of
concepts. Thus we do not depend upon any advanced or
intricate theory of concepts, and therefore do not need
to give a comprehensive detailed account of concepts.
(Ladyman and Presnell, 2016, §8.1)
But without a “comprehensive detailed account of concepts” one is
free to wonder what exactly are the features of concepts that should
follow from our natural understanding of them since the list (i)-(vii)
is obviously non-exhaustive.
With such a naive characterization of concepts there is nothing
preventing us to take for granted other intuitively appealing
features commonly attributed to them such as the principle that a
(mathematical) concept must have clear delimitations to the extent
that it should be determined, with regard to every particular thing
in a mathematical domain of discourse, whether it falls under that
concept or not.6 When taken together with the intensionality of
concepts this principle simply means that a concept must be well-
defined as far as mathematics is concerned. Concepts must have
sharp boundaries and a real number such as π should not be confused
with a topological space, nor a degree such as 45◦ with a group, for
6Frege (1903, §57) makes a strong case that in an exact science such as
mathematics the extension of all concepts must be completely determined,
otherwise a mathematical symbol would not refer to exactly one object (and
consequently lack a reference). In his Foundations of Arithmetic, for instance,
Frege (1884) writes:
All that can be demanded of a concept from the point of view of
logic and with an eye to rigor of proof is only that the limits to
its application should be sharp, that we should be able to decide
definitively about every object whether it falls under that concept
or not. (Frege, 1884, §74)
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example. This principle does not appear to be less appealing than the
properties (i)-(vii) conveniently mentioned by Ladyman and Presnell
(2016, §5.2) and their naive account of concepts naturally admits it
as a fundamental part of our intuitive understanding as well. It
turns out that this principle allows the validation of an integral part
of classical reasoning in the types-as-concepts interpretation, namely,
the unrestricted law of excluded middle, which states that for any
proposition A, either A or its negation, ¬A, is the case. As we
shall see next, the problem is that instantiation of (mathematical)
concepts becomes a bivalent property: given any concept with sharp
boundaries it must be determined for every particular mathematical
entity whether it instantiates that concept or not, so it must be the
case that in the whole totality of mathematical entities either there
is something that falls under that concept or nothing falls under it.7
What does the law of excluded middle say from the perspective
of the types-as-concepts interpretation? Ladyman and Presnell
(2016) mention that the ‘rules governing the formation of types are
understood as ways of composing concepts to form more complex
concepts’ (§7.2) but they never extended the types-as-concepts
interpretation to give a full account of all the type formers of Book
HoTT in their series of papers.8 In other words, for our question
7Notice that this inference requires the addition of a reasoning principle
called the “limited principle of omniscience” (restricted to the domain of all
mathematical entities) to our meta-theory. This principle states that the if a
property is decidable for all objects then the existence of an object with that
property is also decidable, that is, ∀x(P (x) ∨ ¬P (x)) → (∃xP (x) ∨ ¬∃xP (x)).
Although the limited principle of omniscience is weaker than the unrestricted law
of excluded middle, it is important to be clear that it is non-constructive. More
importantly, our argument for the potential validation of the law of excluded
middle will not depend on the limited principle of omniscience, because the
key point is that the type-as-concepts interpretation is unable to refute that
‘in the whole totality of mathematical entities either there is something that
falls under that concept or nothing falls under it’. Another implicit assumption
in the argument is what exactly it means in the proposed concept-explanation
of function-types for a concept to “result in” another concept. But since this
interpretation is the one offered by Ladyman and Presnell (2017, §2.3) themselves
we shall not bother with it here. As we shall see in the next section, univalence
cannot be formulated without function-types, so a vague semantic account of
functions will inevitably lead to a semantic indeterminacy of univalence as far as
the types-as-concepts interpretation is concerned. Thus, all those considerations
do not detract from our main objection: the types-as-concepts interpretation is
very incomplete.
8Except for a brief explanation of the function type: ‘a function is something
that takes an instance of one concept and produces an instance of the other’
(Ladyman and Presnell, 2017, §2.3). In fact, Ladyman and Presnell do not
cover all the basic forms of judgments of Book HoTT (which are the same as
constructive type theory): they provide no explanation of what it means for two
types to be definitionally equal and two terms to be definitionally equal at a
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to be a well-formulated one we need to close this gap by ourselves.
In doing that, we are adopting for the sake of argument what seems
to be the most natural and straightforward possible extension of
the types-as-concepts interpretation—and, coincidentally, given the
propositions-and-types correspondence, the following can be seen
as a propositions-as-concepts alternative account of the traditional
Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov informal semantics of the logical
constants of propositional constructive logic (Troelstra and van
Dalen, 1988) that deals with conceptual subsumption instead of the
usual notion of provability.
Write JAK for the general concept that the type A represents. We
have that:
(×) A concept falling under JA×BK is a pair containing a concept
falling under JAK and a concept falling under JBK;
(+) A concept falling under JA + BK is either a concept falling
under JAK or a concept falling under JBK plus the information
of which concept has been instantiated;
(→) A concept falling under JA→ BK is a concept that, given any
concept falling under JAK, results in a concept falling under
JBK;
(¬) A concept falling under J¬AK is a concept falling under JA →
⊥K;
No concept falls under the empty concept J⊥K.
Now suppose that A is a type that stands for the general concept
JAK. From the assumption that any concept either has something
falling under it or not it follows that either JAK has an instance or
not. If the former is the case, we have a concept falling under JAK
and therefore JA + ¬AK has an instance. If the latter holds then
nothing falls under JAK and JA → ⊥K must have an instance, for
if something falls under JAK the concept a concept falls under JAK
and no concept falls under JAK, which is coextensional with J⊥K,
is instantiated. Thus, the assumption that nothing falls under JAK
leads to an instance of JA + ¬AK and, since A is arbitrary, we have
that A+ ¬A obtains for any A.
Why should we worry about whether or not the types-as-
concepts interpretation validates the law of excluded middle or
type from the perspective of the types-as-concepts interpretation. Given that
Ladyman and Presnell (2015, 2016, 2017) still have much unfinished business
left, it is hard to tell what makes their types-as-concepts interpretation into a
serious informal semantics even for basic constructive type theory at this point.
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any one of its equivalents? The key problem is that the types-
as-concepts interpretation may not serve as an informal semantics
for homotopy type theory because the law of excluded middle, in
its general form that holds for all propositions, is known to be
inconsistent with the univalence axiom (UFP, 2013, cor. 3.2.7).
Put differently, the types-as-concepts interpretation may be logically
incapable of justifying the univalence axiom (to be discussed in
the next section). Although this does not conclusively undermines
the types-as-concepts interpretation the argument presented here
indicates that Ladyman and Presnell’s program cannot rest upon
a naive account of concepts as they wish: a theory of concepts
that is rigorous to a certain extent is absolutely necessary in order
to make the types-as-concepts interpretation sufficiently plausible.
While it is not our intention here to defend the view that any concept
either has something falling under it or not, we understand that
it is Ladyman and Presnell’s responsibility to argue against it and
provide a comprehensive theory of concepts that leaves no margin
for interpretation.
3.3 The univalence axiom
In a nutshell, the univalence axiom is a claim about universe types (a
hierarchy of types that contain other types as their canonical terms)
that implies that two types are equal when they are equivalent in a
technical sense (UFP, 2013, §2.10,§4.2-4),
ua : A ' B → A =Ui B.
To be precise, the full univalence axiom asserts that the canonical
function in the other direction, which is defined by path induction
as a map from reflexivity to the canonical automorphism of a type,
is an equivalence—a statement that, very interestingly, may be
pronounced as “equality is equivalent to equivalence”. The function
ua is thus obtained as the inverse of that map.
Universes allow for greater flexibility in a type theory. The
homotopy type theory book (UFP, 2013), for instance, uses a
particular formulation where the claim that A is a type is often
treated as a claim of type membership in some universe: A is a term
of a universe Ui for some universe level i (and having left the indices
implicit we could simply write A : U).9 This is the sense in which
we can say that univalence speaks of equality of types rather than
equality of terms at a universe type.
9Representing universes and their corresponding types with the same notation
is a characteristic of a postulation of universes a la Russell (Martin-Löf, 1984).
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In their third paper, Ladyman and Presnell (2017) extend their
types-as-concepts interpretation to universes and offer an account of
the univalence axiom in such terms. To that end they must explain
how we may understand universes as concepts and how we may
justify univalence as a claim about concepts. Ladyman and Presnell
(2017) interpret universes “by understanding them as domains of
discourse, where a domain of discourse consists of the concepts and
propositions that are understood and defined in a given discussion”
(§2.3) and observe that this characterization can justify the usual
rules for universes (UFP, 2013, § A.1.1-8,A.2.3-10). Such a detailed
discussion would take us too far from our subject, but the crucial
point here is the extensional character that is attributed to domains
of discourse (it is essential that types have an extensional criterion
of identity for the justification of univalence, otherwise we could not
identify them when they are equivalent). According to Ladyman
and Presnell, ‘[t]here is nothing to a domain of discourse beyond
what particular concepts it contains’ (2017, §2.3) and this is what
allows domains of discourse to be conceived extensionally rather than
intensionally.
Ladyman and Presnell appear to contradict themselves here.
On the one hand, universes are domains of discourse which are
extensional; on the other hand, universes are types and stand for
general concepts—but in their previous paper Ladyman and Presnell
(2016) argued extensively that one of the fundamental features of
concepts is their intrinsic intensional nature:
Concepts are intensional: they correspond (roughly) to
descriptions rather than to extensional collections. Hence
(to use two famous examples), ‘the morning star’ and
‘the evening star’ are two distinct specific intensions,
although they have the same extension; and ‘human’
and ‘featherless biped’ are distinct general intensions
although they have the same extension. We can have
empty concepts, even necessarily empty concepts, and
indeed multiple distinct empty concepts. (Ladyman and
Presnell, 2016, §5.2.4)
Extensional entities should always be compatible with intensional
criteria of identity, but as far as intensional entities and extensional
equality are concerned this statement is clearly false. It is natural to
expect an explanation of why domains of discourse (which are general
concepts) contradict the inherent intensionally of concepts, but no
such clarification is given in their account (Ladyman and Presnell,
2017).
On the basis of their representation of universes as domains of
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discourse, Ladyman and Presnell (2017) support a description of
univalence as the claim that all domains of discourse are univalent
and that of equivalent types as a single mathematical concept under
multiple different presentations (§5.1). However, as Ladyman and
Presnell (2017, §5.1) admit, to justify such a view there is more to
be done.
Inspired by an informal motivation for the univalence axiom given
by Awodey (2014), who argues that univalence captures a common
principle of reasoning embodied in everyday mathematical practice,
Ladyman and Presnell (2017, §7) question if a similar justification
which only appeals to elementary pre-mathematical considerations
is available to us. Awodey’s main argument is that if one wishes for
a foundational system that can reflect the ordinary mathematical
practice where isomorphic objects are identified, then we have good
reasons to choose type-theoretical foundations and, in particular,
univalent ones. Ladyman and Presnell (2017, §7.4) identify two
problems with Awodey’s proposal. The first one is a gap between
“isomorphism” and equivalence: two objects A and B are typically
said to be isomorphic if there are structure-preserving maps
f : A→ B and g : B → A
such that
g ◦ f = 1A and f ◦ g = 1B .
But, type-theoretically, this relation, which in the homotopy type
book is called “quasi-invertibility” (UFP, 2013, §2.4.6), contains too
little data and has a poor behavior: if we have an isomorphism
between A and B witnessed by the functions f : A→ B and g : B →
A, the isomorphism induced by f may have multiple proofs that g is
a quasi-inverse of f , meaning that “the” isomorphism induced by a
function need not be unique (UFP, 2013, §4.1). While one might say
that quasi-invertibility is a natural expression of isomorphism from
traditional mathematics, the statement of full univalence in terms of
quasi-inverses leads to a contradiction. For if the canonical function
that maps equalities to isomorphisms has a quasi-inverse ua′, it would
have to send the collection of isomorphisms induced by a function to
the same equality, thus identifying them and contradicting the fact
that “the” isomorphisms induced by a function are not necessarily
unique.10 Although quasi-invertibility is logically equivalent to
equivalence (in that a function is an equivalence if and only if
it is quasi-invertible) (UFP, 2013, §4.2), the inference is certainly
10Readers may refer to Ladyman and Presnell (2017, §6.5) for more detailed
discussion of the contradiction.
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not pre-mathematical and Ladyman and Presnell’s point is how to
modify Awodey’s argument in a way that replaces ‘isomorphism’
by ‘equivalence’ without validating the inconsistent formulation of
univalence in terms of isomorphism. But it is possible that Awodey
is only using the term ‘isomorphism’ informally as a stand-in for the
technical notion of equivalence, in which case their objection may be
dismissed.
The second problem with Awodey’s argument, as pointed out
by Ladyman and Presnell (2017, §7.4), is that it only seems to be
able to justify part of the univalence axiom, namely, the function
ua : A ' B → A =Ui B. That is to say, there is a canonical function
idtoeqv : A =Ui B → A ' B (UFP, 2013, §2.10.1) in the opposite
direction, defined by path induction by mapping reflexivity paths to
auto-equivalences, but there is no indication that the consideration
of ua as an inverse to idtoeqv in an equivalence (which is something
the full univalence axiom requires) is a common practice of working
mathematicians.
Ladyman and Presnell (2017) consider possible arguments in
response to those issues but they ultimately conclude that in
order to develop Awodey’s argument into a complete justification
for univalence they still need to answer a few questions, for
instance—whether their account of universes as domains of discourse
is well justified, why we should take a structuralist view of
mathematics, and whether their proposed amendments to Awodey’s
argument are legitimate.11
4 Types as concepts or programs?
As was discussed in the previous section, it appears that the types-
as-concepts interpretation can only serve as an incompletely specified
informal semantics for homotopy type theory, at least in its current
stage of development. Ladyman and Presnell (2017) do not provide
a clear interpretation of universes and type formers, and, besides
never addressing higher inductive types, and they do not show that
the types-as-concepts interpretation can validate univalence.
What about the meaning explanations? As seen in Section 2.1,
the meaning explanations of constructive type theory cannot justify
homotopy type theory either, but the reason is different: the
existence of equality proofs other than the reflexivity term has no
11Ladyman and Presnell (2017) discuss an alternative justification for
univalence in §8.1, but since they conclude that ‘[w]hat would be sacrificed on
this approach, then, is the idea that Univalence is true’ it is not so clear what is
gained with the proposed idea. Thus, we shall not discuss it here.
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justification from the viewpoint of this interpretation. Nevertheless,
this does not show that there are no meaning explanations for
homotopy type theory. The key observation here is that a
meaning explanation (a description of how terms and types are
assigned to untyped computations) could be offered to an alternative
computational presentation of homotopy type theory, that is to
say, a stronger type theory that implements univalence and higher
inductive types not as axioms but theorems.
Cubical type theory is a positive step in this direction. Bezem
et al. (2014) have given a constructive model of type theory
that validates the univalence axiom using cubical sets. This is a
variant of Voevodsky’s simplicial model (Kapulkin and Lumsdaine,
forthcoming), using a mathematical concept of cubes due to Kan
(1955) which is more amenable to constructive methods. Cubical
type theories (type-theoretic paraphrases of models in cubical sets)
have been proposed since then. In particular, Cohen et al. (2018)
have developed a cubical type theory which proves univalence and
has possible extensions with some higher inductive types, as made
explicit in Coquand et al. (2018). Recently, Angiuli et al. (2017)
and Cavallo and Harper (2018) have built a realizability model
that can be seen as a higher-dimensional generalization of the
meaning explanations of Martin-Löf for a cubical type theory with a
cumulative hierarchy of univalent universes, full univalence and many
higher-inductive types. Their realizability model may indeed be seen
as a computational justification for homotopy type theory, but, as
it relies on the mathematical concept of cubical set, further work
would be required to investigate whether it could also constitute a
legitimate pre-mathematical justification for homotopy type theory.
The current state of affairs regarding the justification of
homotopy type theory via the meaning explanations and type-as-
concepts interpretation is summarized in Table 1.
Finally, another possibility to be considered is that the homotopy
interpretation criticized by Ladyman and Presnell (2015, 2016,
2017) can be perhaps made pre-mathematical through the use
of spatial intuitions in the sense of Tsementzis (forthcoming),
where an intuitive semantics for homotopy type theory is given
based on notions such as “shapes”, “points”, “symmetries” etc.
But a thorough analysis of the pre-mathematical nature of the
primitive assumptions the interpretation relies on and what rules
it justifies (Tsementzis, forthcoming, §3.1–2) would exceed the scope
of this paper and is thus seen as future work.
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Table 1: A comparison between some informal semantics for type
theory
Meaning explanations (Constructive type theory)
Does it justify path induction? yes
Does it justify the reflection rule/UIP? yes
Does it justify univalence? no
Does it justify higher inductive types? no
Does it justify the law of excluded middle? no
Is it pre-mathematical? yes
Type-as-concepts
Does it justify path induction? unknown
Does it justify the reflection rule/UIP? unknown
Does it justify univalence? unknown
Does it justify higher inductive types? unknown
Does it justify the law of excluded middle? unknown
Is it pre-mathematical? yes
Meaning explanations (Cubical type theory)
Does it justify path induction? yes
Does it justify the reflection rule/UIP? no
Does it justify univalence? yes
Does it justify higher inductive types? yes
Does it justify the law of excluded middle? no
Is it pre-mathematical? unknown
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, Ladyman and Presnell (2017) fail to provide a
decisive answer as to whether homotopy type theory can serve as
an autonomous foundation. Their types-as-concepts interpretation
certainly cannot be seen as a pre-mathematical semantics for
homotopy type theory yet, as some crucial issues will have to be
overcome to make that possible.
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